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Abstract
We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from
strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random
assignment model. If the common prior of the agents is a uniform prior, then a large
class of random mechanisms are OBIC with respect to this prior – this includes the
probabilistic serial mechanism. We then introduce a robust version of OBIC: a mech-
anism is locally robust OBIC if it is OBIC with respect all independent priors in some
neighborhood of a given independent prior. We show that every locally robust OBIC
mechanism satisfying a mild property called elementary monotonicity is strategy-proof.
This leads to a strengthening of the impossibility result in Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001): if there are at least four agents, there is no locally robust OBIC and ordinally
efficient mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals.
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tic serial mechanism.
JEL Code. D47, D82
∗We are grateful to Sven Seuken, Timo Mennle, Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Souvik Roy, and
Wonki Cho for their comments.
†Dasgupta: University of Chicago, ; Mishra: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, dmishra@isid.ac.in
1
1 Introduction
The paper explores the consequences of weakening incentive compatibility from strategy-
proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in the random assignment model (one-
sided matching model). Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) requires that
the truth-telling expected share vector of an agent first-order stochastically dominates the
expected share vector from reporting any other preference. This weakening of strategy-
proofness in mechanism design models without transfers was proposed by d’Aspremont and Peleg
(1988). We study OBIC by considering mechanisms that allow for randomization in the as-
signment model.
In the random assignment model, the set of mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency
and strategy-proofness is quite rich.1 Despite satisfying such strong incentive properties,
all of them either fail to satisfy equal treatment of equals, a weak notion of fairness, or
ordinal efficiency, a stronger but natural notion of efficiency than ex-post efficiency. Indeed,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) propose a new mechanism, called the probabilistic serial
mechanism, which satisfies equal treatment of equals and ordinal efficiency. However, they
show that it fails strategy-proofness, and no mechanism can satisfy all these three properties
simultaneously if there are at least four agents. A primary motivation for weakening the
notion of incentive compatibility to OBIC is to investigate if we can escape this impossibility
result.
We show two types of results. First, if the (common) prior is a uniform probability
distribution over the set of possible preferences, then every neutral mechanism satisfying a
mild property called elementary monotonicity is OBIC.2 An example of such a mechanism
is the probabilistic serial mechanism. This is a positive result and provides a strategic
foundation for the probabilistic serial mechanism. In particular, it shows that there exists
ordinally efficient mechanisms satisfying equal treatment of equals which are OBIC with
respect to the uniform prior.
Second, we explore the implications of strengthening OBIC as follows. A mechanism is
1Pycia and U¨nver (2017) characterize the set of deterministic, strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and non-
bossy mechanisms in this model. This includes generalizations of the top-trading-cycle mechanism.
2Neutrality is a standard axiom in social choice theory which requires that objects are treated symmet-
rically. Elementary monotonicity is a mild monotonicity requirement of a mechanism. We define it formally
in Section 4.
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locally robust OBIC (LROBIC) with respect to an independent prior if it is OBIC with respect
to every independent prior in its “neighborhood”. The motivation for such requirement
of robustness in the mechanism design literature is now well-known, and referred to as
the Wilson doctrine (Wilson, 1987). We show that every LROBIC mechanism satisfying
elementary monotonicity is strategy-proof. An immediate corollary of this result is that
the probabilistic serial mechanism is not LROBIC (though it is OBIC with respect to the
uniform prior). As a corollary, we can show that when there are at least four agents, there
is no LROBIC and ordinally efficient mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals. This
strengthens the seminal impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by replacing
strategy-proofness with LROBIC.
Both our results point to very different implications of OBIC in the presence of elementary
monotonicity – if the prior is uniform, this notion of incentive compatibility is very permissive;
but if we require OBIC with respect to a set of independent priors in any neighborhood of a
given prior, this notion of incentive compatibility is very restrictive. As we discuss in Section
6, such implications have been known for deterministic voting models (Majumdar and Sen,
2004). But ours is the first paper to point this out for the random assignment model.
2 Model
Assignments. There are n agents and n objects.3 Let N := {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents
and A be the set of objects. We define the notion of a feasible assignment first.
Definition 1 An n× n matrix L is an assignment if
Lia ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ a ∈ A∑
a∈A
Lia = 1 ∀ i ∈ N
∑
i∈N
Lia = 1 ∀ a ∈ A
For any assignment L, we write Li as the share vector of agent i. Formally, a share vector is
a probability distribution over the set of objects. For any i ∈ N and any a ∈ A, Lia denotes
3All our results extend even if the number of objects is not the same as the number of agents. We assume
this only to compare our results with the random assignment literature, where this assumption is common.
Also, whenever we say an assignment, we mean a random assignment from now on.
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the “share” of agent i of object a. The second constraint of the assignment definition requires
that the total share of every agent is 1. The third constraint of the assignment requires that
every object is completely assigned. Let L be the set of all assignments.
An assignment L is deterministic if Lia ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and for all a ∈ A. Let
Ld be the set of all deterministic assignments. By the Birkohff-von-Neumann theorem, for
every L ∈ L, there exists a set of deterministic assignments in Ld whose convex combination
generates L.
Preferences. The preference (a strict ordering) of an agent i over A will be denoted
by Pi. The set of all strict preferences over A is denoted by P. A preference profile is
P ≡ (P1, . . . , Pn), and we will denote by P−i the preference profile P excluding the preference
Pi of agent i.
Prior. We assume that the preference of each agent is independently and identically
drawn using a common prior µ, which is a probability distribution over Pn. We will denote
by µ(Pi) the probability with which agent i has preference Pi. With some abuse of notation,
we will denote the probability with which agents in N \ {i} have preference profile P−i as
µ(P−i). Note that by independence, µ(P−i) = ×j 6=iµ(Pj).
3 Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility
Our solution concept is Bayes-Nash equilibrium but we restrict attention to ordinal mecha-
nisms, i.e., mechanisms where we only elicit ranking over objects from each agent. Hence,
whenever we say mechanism, we refer to such ordinal mechanisms.4 Formally, amechanism
is a map Q : Pn → L. A mechanism Q assigns a share vector Qi(P) to agent i at every
preference profile P.
Before discussing the notions of incentive compatibility, it is useful to think how agents
compare share vectors in our model. Fix agent i with a preference Pi over the set of objects
A. Denote the k-th ranked object in Pi as Pi(k). Consider two share vectors π, π
′. For every
a ∈ A, we will denote by πa and π
′
a the share assigned to object a in π and π
′ respectively.
4 The restriction to not consider cardinal mechanisms is arguably arbitrary. But it is consistent with the
literature on random assignment models. We do not know how the set of incentive compatible mechanisms
expand if we consider cardinal mechanisms.
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We will say π first-order-stochastically-dominates (FOSD) π′ according to Pi if
ℓ∑
k=1
πPi(k) ≥
ℓ∑
k=1
π′Pi(k) ∀ ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In this case, we will write π ≻Pi π
′. Notice that ≻Pi is not a complete relation over the
outcomes. An equivalent (and well known) definition of ≻Pi relation is that for every von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation of Pi, the expected utility from π is at least as
much as π′.
The most standard notion of incentive compatibility is strategy-proofness (dominant
strategy incentive compatibility), which uses the FOSD relation to compare share vectors.
Definition 2 A mechanism Q is strategy-proof if for every i ∈ N , every P−i ∈ P
n−1,
and every Pi, P
′
i ∈ P, we have
Qi(Pi, P−i) ≻Pi Qi(P
′
i , P−i).
The interpretation of this definition is that fixing the preferences of other agents, the truth-
telling share vector must FOSD other share vectors that can be obtained by deviation. This
definition of strategy-proofness appeared in Gibbard (1977) for voting problems, and has been
the standard notion in the literature on random voting and random assignment problems.
The ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility notion is an adaptation of this by changing
the solution concept to Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It was first introduced and studied in
a voting committee model in d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988), and was later used in many
voting models (Majumdar and Sen, 2004). To define it formally, we introduce the notion
of an interim share vector. Fix an agent i with preference Pi. Given a mechanism Q, the
interim share of object a for agent i by reporting P ′i is:
qia(P
′
i ) =
∑
P−i∈Pn−1
µ(P−i)Qia(P
′
i , P−i).
The interim share vector of agent i by reporting P ′i will be denoted as qi(P
′
i ).
Definition 3 A mechanism Q is ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC)
(with respect to prior µ) if for every i ∈ N and every Pi, P
′
i ∈ P, we have
qi(Pi) ≻Pi qi(P
′
i ).
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P1 P2 P3 P
′
1 P2 P3
a; 1
2
a; 1
2
c; 3
4
c; 1
2
a; 2
3
c; 1
2
c; 1
4
b; 1
2
a; 0 a; 1
6
b; 1
3
a; 1
6
b; 1
4
c; 0 b; 1
4
b; 1
3
c; 0 b; 1
3
Table 1: Manipulation by agent 1.
It is immediate that if a mechanism Q is strategy-proof it is OBIC with respect to any prior.
Conversely, if a mechanism is OBIC with respect to all priors (including correlated priors),
then it is strategy-proof.
3.1 A motivating example
We investigate a simple example to understand the implications of strategy-proofness and
OBIC for the probabilistic serial mechanism. Suppose n = 3 with three objects {a, b, c}.
Consider the preference profiles (P1, P2, P3) and (P
′
1, P2, P3) shown in Table 3.1 – the ta-
ble also shows the share vector of each agent in the probabilistic serial mechanism of
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). In the probabilistic serial mechanism, each agent starts
“eating” her favorite object simultaneously till the object is finished. Then, she moves to
the best available object according to her preference and so on. Table 3.1 shows the out-
put of the probabilistic serial mechanism for preference profiles (P1, P2, P3) and (P
′
1, P2, P3).
Since Q1a(P1, P2, P3) + Q1c(P1, P2, P3) > Q1a(P
′
1, P2, P3) + Q1c(P
′
1, P2, P3), we conclude that
Q1(P
′
1, P2, P3) ⊁P ′1 Q1(P1, P2, P3). Hence, agent 1 can manipulate from P
′
1 to P1, when agents
2 and 3 have preferences (P2, P3).
When can such a manipulation be prevented by OBIC? Note that P1 is generated from
P ′1 by permuting a and c. Suppose we permute P2 and P3 also to get P
′
2 and P
′
3 respectively:
c P ′2 b P
′
2 a and a P
′
3 c P
′
3 b.
Since the probabilistic serial mechanism is neutral (with respect to objects), the share vector
of agent 1 at (P ′1, P2, P3) is an (a, c) permutation of its share vector at (P1, P
′
2, P
′
3). Further,
when all the preferences are equally likely, the probability of (P2, P3) is equal to the proba-
bility of (P ′2, P
′
3). So, the total expected probability of a and c for agent 1 at P1 and P
′
1 is
the same (where expectation is taken over (P2, P3) and (P
′
2, P
′
3)). As we show below, this
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argument generalizes and the expected share vector at P ′1 first-order-stochastic-dominates
the expected share vector at P1 when the true preference is P
′
1 and prior is uniform.
4 Uniform prior and possibilities
In this section, we present our first result which shows that the set of OBIC mechanisms is
much larger than the set of strategy-proof mechanisms if the prior is the uniform prior. A
prior µ is the uniform prior if µ(Pi) =
1
|P|
= 1
n!
for each Pi ∈ P. Uniform prior puts equal
probability on each of the possible preferences. We call a mechanism U-OBIC if it is OBIC
with respect to the uniform prior.
We show that there is a large class of mechanisms which are U-OBIC - this will include
some well-known mechanisms which are known to be not strategy-proof. This class is char-
acterized by two axioms, neutrality and elementary monotonicity, which we define next. To
define neutrality, consider any permutation σ : A → A of the set of objects. For every
preference Pi, let P
σ
i be the preference generated when the permutation σ is applied to Pi.
Let Pσ be the preference profile generated by permuting each preference in the preference
profile P by the permutation σ.
Definition 4 A mechanism Q is neutral if for every P and every permutation σ,
Qia(P) = Qiσ(a)(P
σ) ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ a ∈ A.
Neutrality requires that objects be treated symmetrically by the mechanism. Any mechanism
which does not use the “names” of the objects is neutral – this includes the random prior-
ity mechanisms, the simultaneous eating algorithm mechanisms (including the probabilistic
serial mechanism) in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
Our next axiom is elementary monotonicity, an axiom which requires a mild form of
monotonicity. To define it, we need the notion of “adjacency” of preferences. We say prefer-
ences Pi and P
′
i are adjacent if there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} such that
Pi(k) = P
′
i (k + 1), Pi(k + 1) = P
′
i (k), and Pi(k
′) = P ′i (k
′) ∀ k′ /∈ {k, k + 1}.
In other words, P ′i is obtained by swapping consecutively ranked objects in Pi. Here, if
Pi(k) = a and Pi(k + 1) = b, we say that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi.
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Definition 5 A mechanism Q satisfies elementary monotonicity if for every i ∈ N ,
every P−i ∈ P
n−1, and every Pi, P
′
i ∈ P such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi, we have
Qib(P
′
i , P−i) ≥ Qib(Pi, P−i)
Qia(P
′
i , P−i) ≤ Qib(Pi, P−i).
In other words, as agent i lifts alternative b in ranking by one position by swapping it
with a (and keeping the ranking of every other object the same), elementary monotonicity
requires that the share of object b should weakly increase for agent i, while share of object a
should weakly decrease. It is not difficult to see that elementary monotonicity is a necessary
condition for strategy-proofness. As we show later, elementary monotonicity is satisfied by a
variety of mechanisms - including those which are not strategy-proof. However, every neutral
mechanism satisfying elementary monotonicity is U-OBIC.
Theorem 1 Every neutral mechanism satisfying elementary monotonicity is U-OBIC.
Proof : Fix a neutral mechanism Q satisfying elementary monotonicity. The proof goes in
various steps.
Step 1. Pick an agent i and two preferences Pi and P
′
i . Pick any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and suppose
Pi(k) = a and P
′
i (k) = b. We show that qia(Pi) = qib(P
′
i ). This is a consequence of uniform
prior and neutrality. To see this, let P ′i = P
σ
i for some permutation σ of objects in A. Then,
b = σ(a) and hence, for every P−i, we have
Qia(Pi, P−i) = Qiσ(a)(P
σ
i , P
σ
−i) = Qib(P
′
i , P
σ
−i).
Due to uniform prior and using the above expression,
qia(Pi) =
1
n!
∑
P−i
Qia(Pi, P−i) =
1
n!
∑
P−i
Qib(P
′
i , P
σ
−i) =
1
n!
∑
P−i
Qib(P
′
i , P−i) = qib(P
′
i ),
where the third equality follows from the fact that {P−i : P−i ∈ P
n−1} = {P σ−i : P−i ∈ P
n−1}.
In view of step 1, with some abuse of notation, we write qik to denote the interim share
of the object at rank k in the preference. We call qi the interim rank vector of agent i.
Step 2. Pick an agent i and a preference Pi. We show that qik ≥ qi(k+1) for all k ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1} (i.e., interim shares are non-decreasing with rank). Fix a k and let Pi(k) = a
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and Pi(k+1) = b. Then, consider the preference P
′
i , which is an (a, b)-swap of Pi. For every
P−i, elementary monotonicity implies Qia(Pi, P−i) ≥ Qia(P
′
i , P−i). Due to uniform prior,
qia(Pi) ≥ qia(P
′
i ). But by Step 1,
qik = qia(Pi) ≥ qia(P
′
i ) = qi(k+1).
Step 3. We show that Q is OBIC with respect to uniform priors. Suppose agent i has
preference Pi. By Steps 1 and 2, he gets interim rank vector (qi1, . . . , qin) by reporting Pi
with qij ≥ qij+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Suppose she reports P
′
i = P
σ
i , where σ is some
permutation of set of objects. By Steps 1 and 2, the interim share vector is a permutation of
interim rank vector qi . Using non-decreasingness of this interim share vector with respect
to ranks, we get qi(Pi) ≻Pi qi(P
′
i ). Hence, Q is OBIC with respect to uniform prior. 
Theorem 1 significantly generalizes, an analogous result in Majumdar and Sen (2004),
who consider the voting problem and only deterministic mechanisms. They arrive at the
same conclusion as Theorem 1 in their model. Theorem 1 shows that their result holds even
in the random assignment problem.
4.1 Probabilistic serial mechanism and U-OBIC
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) define a family of mechanisms, which they call the simul-
taneous eating algorithms (SEA). Though the SEAs are not strategy-proof, they satisfy
compelling efficiency and fairness properties, which we discuss in Section 5. We informally
introduce the SEAs – for a formal discussion, see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
Each SEA is defined by a (possibly time-varying) eating speed function for each agent.
At every preference profile, agents simultaneously start “eating” their favorite objects at a
rate equal to their eating speed. Once an object is completely eaten (i.e., the entire share
of 1 is consumed), the amount eaten by each agent is the share of that agent of that object.
Once an object completely eaten, agents go to their next preferred object and so on.
If the eating speed of each agent is the same, then the simultaneous eating algorithm is
anonymous. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) call the unique anonymous SEA, the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism. 5
5For axiomatic characterization of the PS mechanism, see Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012) and
Hashimoto et al. (2014).
9
Corollary 1 Every simultaneous eating algorithm mechanism is U-OBIC.
Proof : Clearly, the SEAs are neutral. The SEAs also satisfy elementary monotonicity (Cho,
2018; Mennle and Seuken, 2018).6 Hence, by Theorem 1, we are done. 
5 Locally robust OBIC
While the uniform prior is an important prior in decision theory, it is natural to ask if
Theorem 1 extends to other “generic” priors. Though we do not have a full answer to this
question, we have been able to answer this question in negative under a natural robustness
requirement. Our robustness requirement is local. Take any independent prior µ, and let µ′
be any independent prior in the ǫ-radius ball around µ (where ǫ > 0), i.e., ||µ(P )−µ′(P )|| < ǫ
for all P ∈ P. In this case, we write µ′ ∈ Bǫ(µ). Our local robustness requirement is the
following.
Definition 6 A mechanism Q is locally robust OBIC (LROBIC) with respect to an
independent prior µ if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for every independent prior µ′ ∈ Bǫ(µ),
Q is OBIC with respect to µ′.
It is well known that Bayesian incentive compatibility with respect to all priors lead to
strategy-proofness (Ledyard, 1978). Here, we require OBIC with respect to all independent
priors in the ǫ-neighborhood of an independent prior. Bhargava et al. (2015) study a version
of LROBIC with respect to uniform prior but their robustness also allows the mechanism
to be OBIC with respect to correlated priors. They show that a large class of voting rules
satisfy their notion of OBIC. We show that in the random assignment model, LROBIC with
respect to any independent prior has a very different implication.
Theorem 2 A mechanism is LROBIC with respect to an independent prior and satisfies
elementary monotonicity if and only if it is strategy-proof.
Proof : Every strategy-proof mechanism is OBIC with respect to any prior. A strategy-
proof mechanism satisfies elementary monotonicity (Mishra, 2016). So, we now focus on
6See Theorem 3 and the discussions following Theorem 3 in Cho (2018)
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the other direction of the proof. Let Q be an LROBIC mechanism with respect to an inde-
pendent prior µ. Suppose Q satisfies elementary monotonicity. We do the proof in two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we decompose OBIC into three conditions. This decomposition is
similar to the decomposition of strategy-proofness in Mennle and Seuken (2018) – there are
some minor differences in axioms and we look at interim share vectors whereas they look at
ex-post share vectors.
Our decomposition of OBIC uses the following three axioms.
Definition 7 A mechanism Q satisfies interim elementary monotonicity if for every
i ∈ N and every Pi, P
′
i such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi, we have
qib(P
′
i ) ≥ qib(Pi)
qia(P
′
i ) ≤ qia(Pi).
Give a preference ordering Pi of agent i and an object a ∈ A, define U(a, Pi) := {x ∈ A :
x Pi a} and L(a, Pi) := {x ∈ A : a Pi x}.
Definition 8 A mechanism Q satisfies interim upper invariance if for every i ∈ N and
every Pi, P
′
i such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi, and for every x ∈ U(a, Pi), we have
qix(P
′
i ) = qix(Pi).
Definition 9 A mechanism Q satisfies interim lower invariance if for every i ∈ N and
every Pi, P
′
i such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi, and for every x ∈ L(b, Pi), we have
qix(P
′
i ) = qix(Pi).
The following proposition characterizes OBIC using these axioms.
Proposition 1 A mechanism Q is OBIC with respect to a common independent prior if and
only if it satisfies interim elementary monotonicity, interim upper invariance, and interim
lower invariance.
Since the proof of Proposition 1 is similar to the characteration of strategy-proofness in
Mennle and Seuken (2018), we postpone its proof to the Supplementary Appendix A.
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Step 2. Using Proposition 1, we now complete the proof. Pick an agent i ∈ N and
Pi, P
′
i ∈ P such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi. By Proposition 1, Q satisfies interim upper
invariance and interim lower invariance. Hence, we know that for all c /∈ {a, b}, we get
∑
P−i
µ(P−i)
[
Qic(Pi, P−i)−Qic(P
′
i , P−i)
]
= 0. (1)
Since µ is a probability distribution over P, we can treat it as a vector in Rn!−1. Using
µ(P−i) ≡ ×j 6=iµ(Pj), we note that the LHS of the Equation 1 is a polynomial function of
{µ(P )}P∈P. The equation describes the zero set of this polynomial function, which has
measure zero (Caron and Traynor, 2005). Hence, given any independent prior µ∗ and ǫ > 0,
if Equation 1 has to hold for all µ ∈ Bǫ(µ
∗) (which has non-zero measure), then Qic(Pi, P−i) =
Qic(P
′
i , P−i) for all c /∈ {a, b}.
Hence, for any LROBIC mechanism Q, for every i ∈ N , for every P−i, if we consider two
preferences Pi and P
′
i such that P
′
i is an (a, b) swap of Pi, we see that for all c /∈ {a, b}, we
have Qic(Pi, P−i) = Qic(P
′
i , P−i). Hence, we have shown that Q satisfies ex-post versions of
our interim lower invariance and interim upper invariance. Mennle and Seuken (2018) refer
to these properties as upper invariance and lower invariance (see also Cho (2018)). They
show that upper invariance, lower invariance, and elementary monotonicity are equivalent to
strategy-proofness. Since Q satisfies elementary monotonicity, it is strategy-proof. 
We now explore the compatibility of LOBIC and ordinal efficiency.
Definition 10 A mechansim Q is ordinally efficient if at every preference profile P there
exists no assignment L such that
Li ≻Pi Qi(P) ∀ i ∈ N,
with Li 6= Qi(P) for some i.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that every ordinally efficient mechanism is ex-post
efficient but the converse is not true if n ≥ 4. In fact, for n ≥ 4, strategy-proofness is
incompatible with ordinally efficiency along with the following weak fairness criterion.
Definition 11 A mechanism Q satisfies equal treatment of equals if at every preference
profile P and for every i, j ∈ N , we have
[
Pi = Pj
]
⇒
[
Qi(P) = Qj(P)
]
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Due to Theorem 2, we can strengthen the impossibility results in Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) and Mennle and Seuken (2017) as follows.
Corollary 2 Suppose n ≥ 4. Then, there is no locally robust OBIC and ordinally efficient
mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals.
Proof : By Theorem 2, a locally robust OBIC mechanism satisfies ex-post versions of up-
per invariance and lower invariance. Mennle and Seuken (2017) show that the proof in
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) can be adapted by replacing strategy-proofness with ex-
post versions of upper invariance and lower invariance. Hence, these two properties are
incompatible with ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals for n ≥ 4, and we are
done. 
6 Relation to the literature
There is fairly large literature on random assignment problems. We briefly summarize them
and relate them to our results. We also discuss the literature on ordinal Bayesian incentive
compatibility.
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility. Strategy-proofness is a demanding re-
quirement in the voting models. Specially, when the domain of preferences is unrestricted,
strategy-proofness and unanimity lead to dictatorship (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975;
Gibbard, 1977). Majumdar and Sen (2004) weaken strategy-proofness to OBIC in the voting
models but restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. They show that every determin-
istic neutral voting mechanism satisfying elementary monotonicity is OBIC with respect to
uniform priors. Our Theorem 1 shows that this result generalizes to the random assignment
model. Majumdar and Sen (2004) also show that with “generic” priors, every deterministic
OBIC mechanism satisfying unanimity is a dictatorship in the unrestricted domain. Mishra
(2016) generalizes this result to some restricted domains of voting (like the single peaked
domain). He shows that in the deterministic voting model, elementary monotonicity and
OBIC with respect to “generic” prior is equivalent to strategy-proofness in a variety of re-
stricted domains – see also Hong and Kim (2018) for a strengthening of this result. Though
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these results are similar to our Theorem 2, there are significant differences. First, we con-
sider randomization while these results are only for deterministic mechanisms. Our notion
of locally robust OBIC is stronger than OBIC with respect to generic priors used in these
papers. Second, ours is a model of private good allocation (random assignment), while these
papers deal with the voting model.
Random assignment model. The deterministic assignment model stands on the pillars
of two mechanisms: (a) serial dictatorship and (b) top trading cycle. These mechanisms are
ex-post efficient and strategy-proof. In fact, these mechanisms satisfy a stronger incentive
property called group strategy-proofness, which is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-
bossiness. For characterizations of deterministic mechanisms satisfying Pareto efficiency and
group strategy-proofness, see Pycia and U¨nver (2017); Pa´pai (2000); Svensson (1999).
A natural motivation for studying random mechanisms is fairness. This motivates the
study of random serial dictatorship or, as they are commonly called, the random prior-
ity mechanisms. The random priority mechanisms are fair but they fail a natural efficiency
criteria called ordinal efficiency. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce a family of mech-
anisms called simultaneous eating algorithms which generate ordianally efficient random as-
signments.7 The probabilistic serial mechanism belongs to this family and it is anonymous.
However, it is not strategy-proof. In fact, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that there
is no ordinally efficient and strategy-proof mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals
when there are at least four agents.8
There is a small literature that provides strategic foundations to the probabilistic se-
rial (PS) mechanism. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that the PS mechanism sat-
isfies weak-strategy-proofness. Their notion of weak strategy-proofness requires that the
manipulation share vector cannot first-order-stochastic-dominate the truth-telling share vec-
tor. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) study a problem where agents have an outside option.
When agents have the same ordinal ranking over objects but the position of outside option
in the ranking of objects is the only private information, they show that the PS mech-
anism is strategy-proof. In fact, they show that the PS mechanism is characterized by
strategy-proofness, ordinal efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. This can be viewed
7Katta and Sethuraman (2006) extend the simultaneous eating algorithm to allow for ties in preferences.
8With three agent, the random priority mechanism satisfies these properties.
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as a domain restriction to achieve strategy-proofness of the PS mechanism. Other contri-
butions in this direction include Liu (2019); Liu and Zeng (2019), who identifies domains
where the probabilistic serial mechanism is strategy-proof. Che and Kojima (2010) show
that the PS mechanism and the random priority mechanism (which is strategy-proof) are
asymptotically equivalent. Similarly, Kojima and Manea (2010) show that when sufficiently
many copies of an object are present, then the PS mechanism is strategy-proof. Thus, in
large economies, the PS mechanism is strategy-proof. Balbuzanov (2016) introduce a notion
of strategy-proofness which is stronger than weak strategy-proofness and show that the PS
mechanism satisfies it. His notion of strategy-proofness is based on the “convex” domination
of lotteries, and hence, called convex strategy-proofness. Mennle and Seuken (2018) define
a notion called partial strategy-proofness, which is weaker than strategy-proofness and show
that the PS mechanism satisfies it. They show that strategy-proofness is equivalent to up-
per invariant, lower invariant and elementary monotonicity (they call it swap monotonicity).
Their notion of partial strategy-proofness is equivalent to upper invariance and elementary
monotonicity, and hence, it is weaker than strategy-proofness. The main difference between
these weakenings of strategy-proofness and ours is that OBIC is a prior-based notion of in-
centive compatibility. It is the natural analogue of Bayesian incentive compatibility in an
ordinal environment. Ehlers and Masso´ (2007) study OBIC in a two-sided matching prob-
lem. Their main focus is on stable mechanisms. They characterize the beliefs for which a
stable mechanism is OBIC.
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A Supplementary Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof : The proof uses locally OBIC.
Definition 12 A mechanism Q is locally ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible
(locally OBIC) with respect to an independent common prior µ if for every i ∈ N and
every Pi, P
′
i ∈ P such that P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of Pi, we have
qi(Pi) ≻Pi qi(P
′
i ).
Locally OBIC only considers a subset of incentive constraints. Using Carroll (2012); Cho
(2016), we conclude that locally OBIC implies OBIC in our model. Hence, it is enough
to show that interim elementary monotonicity, interim upper invariance, and interim lower
invariance are equivalent to locally OBIC.
Suppose Q is locally OBIC. Fix agent i ∈ N and consider Pi and P
′
i such that P
′
i is an
(a, b)-swap of Pi.
interim upper invariance. If U(a, Pi) = ∅, then there is nothing to show. Else, let
U(a, Pi) = {a1, . . . , ak} with a1 Pi a2 Pi . . . Pi ak. Note that since P
′
i is an (a, b)-swap of
Pi, we have a1 P
′
i a2 P
′
i . . . P
′
i ak. Using OBIC, we get
qia1(Pi) ≥ qia1(P
′
i ) and qia1(P
′
i ) ≥ qia1(Pi). (2)
Hence, qia1(Pi) = qia1(P
′
i ). Now, suppose qiaj (Pi) = qiaj (P
′
i ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ− 1}, where
ℓ ≤ k. Then, using OBIC again, we get
ℓ∑
h=1
qiah(Pi) ≥
ℓ∑
h=1
qiah(P
′
i ) and
ℓ∑
h=1
qiah(P
′
i ) ≥
ℓ∑
h=1
qiah(Pi).
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Hence, we get
∑ℓ
h=1 qiah(Pi) =
∑ℓ
h=1 qiah(P
′
i ). But qiaj (Pi) = qiaj (P
′
i ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ−1}
implies that qiaℓ(Pi) = qiaℓ(P
′
i ). By induction, we conclude that Q satisfies interim upper
invariance.
interim elementary monotonicity. Interim elementary monotonicity follows by con-
sidering OBIC from P ′i to Pi:
∑
x∈U(a,P ′i )
qix(P
′
i ) + qib(P
′
i ) ≥
∑
x∈U(a,P ′i )
qix(Pi) + qib(Pi).
But interim upper invariance implies that qib(P
′
i ) ≥ qib(Pi) as desired. A similar proof shows
qia(P
′
i ) ≤ qia(Pi).
interim lower invariance. By OBIC,
∑
x∈U(a,Pi)
qix(Pi) + qia(Pi) + qib(Pi) ≥
∑
x∈U(a,Pi)
qix(P
′
i ) + qia(P
′
i ) + qib(P
′
i )
Using interim upper invariance of Q, we get
qia(Pi) + qib(Pi) ≥ qia(P
′
i ) + qib(P
′
i ).
The OBIC constraint from P ′i to Pi is similar and gives the other inequality and we conclude
qia(Pi) + qib(Pi) = qia(P
′
i ) + qib(P
′
i ).
With this, we can repeat the argument of interim upper invariance to get interim lower
invariance.
The converse statement that any Q satisfying interim elementary monotonicity, interim
upper invariance, and interim lower invariance is locally OBIC is straightforward, and left
to the reader. 
19
